1. 18 Feb, 2016 4 commits
  2. 17 Feb, 2016 4 commits
    • index: allow read of index w/ illegal entries · 318b825e
      Allow `git_index_read` to handle reading existing indexes with
      illegal entries.  Allow the low-level `git_index_add` to add
      properly formed `git_index_entry`s even if they contain paths
      that would be illegal for the current filesystem (eg, `AUX`).
      Continue to disallow `git_index_add_bypath` from adding entries
      that are illegal universally illegal (eg, `.git`, `foo/../bar`).
      Edward Thomson committed
    • iterator: assert tree_iterator has a frame · 4fea9cff
      Although a `tree_iterator` that failed to be properly created
      does not have a frame, all other `tree_iterator`s should.  Do not
      call `pop` in the failure case, but assert that in all other
      cases there is a frame.
      Edward Thomson committed
    • Validate pointer before access the member. · a218b2f6
      When Git repository at network locations, sometimes git_iterator_for_tree
      fails at iterator__update_ignore_case so it goes to git_iterator_free.
      Null pointer will crash the process if not check.
      
      Signed-off-by: Colin Xu <colin.xu@gmail.com>
      Colin Xu committed
    • win32: tests around handling forbidden paths · 4be2aa57
      Introduce a repository that contains some paths that were illegal
      on PC-DOS circa 1981 (like `aux`, `con`, `com1`) and that in a
      bizarre fit of retrocomputing, remain illegal on some "modern"
      computers, despite being "new technology".
      
      Introduce some aspirational tests that suggest that we should be
      able to cope with trees and indexes that contain paths that
      would be illegal on the filesystem, so that we can at least diff
      them.  Further ensure that checkout will not write a repository
      with forbidden paths.
      Edward Thomson committed
  3. 16 Feb, 2016 3 commits
  4. 15 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  5. 11 Feb, 2016 7 commits
  6. 10 Feb, 2016 2 commits
    • coverity: use https URL for posting build · 50174ab4
      When posting our instrumented build results to Coverity we have
      to include sensitive information, in particular our authorization
      token. Currently we use an unencrypted channel to post this
      information, leading to the token being transferred in plain.
      
      Fix this by using a secured connection instead.
      Patrick Steinhardt committed
    • coverity: provide nodef for GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC · 8dddea42
      Coverity currently lists a lot of errors with regard to
      GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC causing resource leaks. We know this macro is
      only invoked when we want to abort because we are out of memory.
      
      Coverity allows for overriding the default model where we know
      that certain functions guarantee a desired behavior. The
      user_nodefs.h is used to override the behavior of macros.
      Re-define GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC inside of it to specify its abort
      nature.
      Patrick Steinhardt committed
  7. 09 Feb, 2016 15 commits
  8. 08 Feb, 2016 2 commits
  9. 07 Feb, 2016 1 commit
  10. 05 Feb, 2016 1 commit