- 12 Oct, 2018 16 commits
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Refactor citest.sh to enable local testing by developers. (cherry picked from commit 451b0017)
Edward Thomson committed -
(cherry picked from commit bf418f09)
Edward Thomson committed -
Add citest.ps1 PowerShell script to run the tests. (cherry picked from commit e2cc5b6d)
Edward Thomson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 3b6281fa)
Edward Thomson committed -
Simplify the names for the tests, removing the unnecessary "libgit2-clar" prefix. Make "all" the new default test run, and include the online tests by default (since HTTPS should always be enabled). For the CI tests, create an offline-only test, then the various online tests. (cherry picked from commit ce798b25)
Edward Thomson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 61eaaadf)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 149790b9)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 4c969618)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 0fb8c1d0)
Etienne Samson committed -
The goal is to let cmake manage the parallelism (cherry picked from commit 1f4ada2a)
Etienne Samson committed -
==17851== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc() ==17851== at 0x4C2BDEC: free (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==17851== by 0x60BBE2B: __libc_freeres (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.19.so) ==17851== by 0x4A256BC: _vgnU_freeres (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_core-amd64-linux.so) ==17851== by 0x5F8F16A: __run_exit_handlers (exit.c:97) ==17851== by 0x5F8F1F4: exit (exit.c:104) ==17851== by 0x5F74F4B: (below main) (libc-start.c:321) ==17851== Address 0x63153c0 is 0 bytes inside data symbol "noai6ai_cached" (cherry picked from commit 234443e3)
Etienne Samson committed -
==2957== 912 bytes in 19 blocks are still reachable in loss record 323 of 369 ==2957== at 0x4C2AB80: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==2957== by 0x675B120: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x675BDF8: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x675FE0D: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x6761DC4: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x676477E: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x675B071: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x675B544: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x675914B: gcry_control (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==2957== by 0x5D30EC9: libssh2_init (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssh2.so.1.0.1) ==2957== by 0x66BCCD: git_transport_ssh_global_init (ssh.c:910) ==2957== by 0x616443: init_common (global.c:65) (cherry picked from commit dd75885a)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 573c4089)
Etienne Samson committed -
==18109== 664 bytes in 1 blocks are still reachable in loss record 279 of 339 ==18109== at 0x4C2AB80: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ==18109== by 0x675B120: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==18109== by 0x675C13C: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==18109== by 0x675C296: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==18109== by 0x679BD14: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==18109== by 0x679CC64: ??? (in /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2) ==18109== by 0x6A64946: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgnutls.so.26.22.6) ==18109== by 0x6A116E8: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgnutls.so.26.22.6) ==18109== by 0x6A01114: gnutls_global_init (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libgnutls.so.26.22.6) ==18109== by 0x52A6C78: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl-gnutls.so.4.3.0) ==18109== by 0x5285ADC: curl_global_init (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl-gnutls.so.4.3.0) ==18109== by 0x663524: git_curl_stream_global_init (curl.c:44) (cherry picked from commit c0c9e9ee)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 74b0a432)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 2f4e7cb0)
Etienne Samson committed
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- 05 Oct, 2018 7 commits
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Security release v0.27.5
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
Patrick Steinhardt committed
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Patrick Steinhardt committed
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These can be used to inject options in an implementation which performs a recursive clone by executing an external command via crafted url and path attributes such that it triggers a local executable to be run. The library is not vulnerable as we do not rely on external executables but a user of the library might be relying on that so we add this protection. This matches this aspect of git's fix for CVE-2018-17456.
Carlos Martín Nieto committed -
Carlos Martín Nieto committed
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In case a configuration includes a key "include.path=" without any value, the generated configuration entry will have its value set to `NULL`. This is unexpected by the logic handling includes, and as soon as we try to calculate the included path we will unconditionally dereference that `NULL` pointer and thus segfault. Fix the issue by returning early in both `parse_include` and `parse_conditional_include` in case where the `file` argument is `NULL`. Add a test to avoid future regression. The issue has been found by the oss-fuzz project, issue 10810. (cherry picked from commit d06d4220)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
While our tests in config::include create a plethora of configuration files, most of them do not get removed at the end of each test. This can cause weird interactions with tests that are being run at a later stage if these later tests try to create files or directories with the same name as any of the created configuration files. Fix the issue by unlinking all created files at the end of these tests. (cherry picked from commit bf662f7c)
Patrick Steinhardt committed
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- 03 Oct, 2018 12 commits
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Right now, we simply ignore the `linelen` parameter of `git_pkt_parse_line` in case the caller passed in zero. But in fact, we never want to assume anything about the provided buffer length and always want the caller to pass in the available number of bytes. And in fact, checking all the callers, one can see that the funciton is never being called in case where the buffer length is zero, and thus we are safe to remove this check. (cherry picked from commit 1bc5b05c)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
The `parse_len` function currently directly returns the parsed length of a packet line or an error code in case there was an error. Instead, convert this to our usual style of using the return value as error code only and returning the actual value via an out-parameter. Thus, we can now convert the output parameter to an unsigned type, as the size of a packet cannot ever be negative. While at it, we also move the check whether the input buffer is long enough into `parse_len` itself. We don't really want to pass around potentially non-NUL-terminated buffers to functions without also passing along the length, as this is dangerous in the unlikely case where other callers for that function get added. Note that we need to make sure though to not mess with `GIT_EBUFS` error codes, as these indicate not an error to the caller but that he needs to fetch more data. (cherry picked from commit c05790a8)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
The parameters of the `git_pkt_parse_line` function are quite confusing. First, there is no real indicator what the `out` parameter is actually all about, and it's not really clear what the `bufflen` parameter refers to. Reorder and rename the parameters to make this more obvious. (cherry picked from commit 0b3dfbf4)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
When checking whether an "unpack" packet returned the "ok" status or not, we use a call to `git__prefixcmp`. In case where the passed line isn't properly NUL terminated, though, this may overrun the line buffer. Fix this by using `git__prefixncmp` instead. (cherry picked from commit 5fabaca8)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
When parsing "ng" packets, we blindly assume that the character immediately following the "ng" prefix is a space and skip it. As the calling function doesn't make sure that this is the case, we can thus end up blindly accepting an invalid packet line. Fix the issue by using `git__prefixncmp`, checking whether the line starts with "ng ". (cherry picked from commit b5ba7af2)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
There are two different buffer overflows present when parsing "ok" packets. First, we never verify whether the line already ends after "ok", but directly go ahead and also try to skip the expected space after "ok". Second, we then go ahead and use `strchr` to scan for the terminating newline character. But in case where the line isn't terminated correctly, this can overflow the line buffer. Fix the issues by using `git__prefixncmp` to check for the "ok " prefix and only checking for a trailing '\n' instead of using `memchr`. This also fixes the issue of us always requiring a trailing '\n'. Reported by oss-fuzz, issue 9749: Crash Type: Heap-buffer-overflow READ {*} Crash Address: 0x6310000389c0 Crash State: ok_pkt git_pkt_parse_line git_smart__store_refs Sanitizer: address (ASAN) (cherry picked from commit a9f1ca09)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
We are being quite lenient when parsing "ACK" packets. First, we didn't correctly verify that we're not overrunning the provided buffer length, which we fix here by using `git__prefixncmp` instead of `git__prefixcmp`. Second, we do not verify that the actual contents make any sense at all, as we simply ignore errors when parsing the ACKs OID and any unknown status strings. This may result in a parsed packet structure with invalid contents, which is being silently passed to the caller. This is being fixed by performing proper input validation and checking of return codes. (cherry picked from commit bc349045)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
While the function parsing ref packets doesn't have any immediately obvious buffer overflows, it's style is different to all the other parsing functions. Instead of checking buffer length while we go, it does a check up-front. This causes the code to seem a lot more magical than it really is due to some magic constants. Refactor the function to instead make use of the style of other packet parser and verify buffer lengths as we go. (cherry picked from commit 5edcf5d1)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
In the `git_pkt_parse_line` function, we determine what kind of packet a given packet line contains by simply checking for the prefix of that line. Except for "ERR" packets, we always only check for the immediate identifier without the trailing space (e.g. we check for an "ACK" prefix, not for "ACK "). But for "ERR" packets, we do in fact include the trailing space in our check. This is not really much of a problem at all, but it is inconsistent with all the other packet types and thus causes confusion when the `err_pkt` function just immediately skips the space without checking whether it overflows the line buffer. Adjust the check in `git_pkt_parse_line` to not include the trailing space and instead move it into `err_pkt` for consistency. (cherry picked from commit 786426ea)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
When parsing data, progress or error packets, we need to copy the contents of the rest of the current packet line into the flex-array of the parsed packet. To keep track of this array's length, we then assign the remaining length of the packet line to the structure. We do have a mismatch of types here, as the structure's `len` field is a signed integer, while the length that we are assigning has type `size_t`. On nearly all platforms, this shouldn't pose any problems at all. The line length can at most be 16^4, as the line's length is being encoded by exactly four hex digits. But on a platforms with 16 bit integers, this assignment could cause an overflow. While such platforms will probably only exist in the embedded ecosystem, we still want to avoid this potential overflow. Thus, we now simply change the structure's `len` member to be of type `size_t` to avoid any integer promotion. (cherry picked from commit 40fd84cc)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
When we parse the packet type of an incoming packet line, we do not verify that we don't overflow the provided line buffer. Fix this by using `git__prefixncmp` instead and passing in `len`. As we have previously already verified that `len <= linelen`, we thus won't ever overflow the provided buffer length. (cherry picked from commit 4a5804c9)
Patrick Steinhardt committed -
The commits following this commit are about to introduce quite a lot of refactoring and tightening of the smart packet parser. Unfortunately, we do not yet have any tests despite our online tests that verify that our parser does not regress upon changes. This is doubly unfortunate as our online tests aren't executed by default. Add new tests that exercise the smart parsing logic directly by executing `git_pkt_parse_line`. (cherry picked from commit 365d2720)
Patrick Steinhardt committed
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- 01 Oct, 2018 5 commits
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If the remote sends a too-short packet, we'll allow `len` to go negative and eventually issue a malloc for <= 0 bytes on ``` pkt->head.name = git__malloc(alloclen); ``` (cherry picked from commit 437ee5a7)
Nelson Elhage committed -
(cherry picked from commit 08961c9d)
Etienne Samson committed -
(cherry picked from commit 895a668e)
Nelson Elhage committed -
(cherry picked from commit 90cf8607)
Nelson Elhage committed -
(cherry picked from commit 50dd7fea)
Christian Schlack committed
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