Unverified Commit 6777db8e by Patrick Steinhardt Committed by GitHub

Merge pull request #5331 from pks-t/security-fixes

Security fixes for master
parents 6bd37c34 b8b8eee3
v0.28 + 1
---------
# Security Fixes
- CVE-2019-1348: the fast-import stream command "feature
export-marks=path" allows writing to arbitrary file paths. As
libgit2 does not offer any interface for fast-import, it is not
susceptible to this vulnerability.
- CVE-2019-1349: by using NTFS 8.3 short names, backslashes or
alternate filesystreams, it is possible to cause submodules to
be written into pre-existing directories during a recursive
clone using git. As libgit2 rejects cloning into non-empty
directories by default, it is not susceptible to this
vulnerability.
- CVE-2019-1350: recursive clones may lead to arbitrary remote
code executing due to improper quoting of command line
arguments. As libgit2 uses libssh2, which does not require us
to perform command line parsing, it is not susceptible to this
vulnerability.
- CVE-2019-1351: Windows provides the ability to substitute
drive letters with arbitrary letters, including multi-byte
Unicode letters. To fix any potential issues arising from
interpreting such paths as relative paths, we have extended
detection of DOS drive prefixes to accomodate for such cases.
- CVE-2019-1352: by using NTFS-style alternative file streams for
the ".git" directory, it is possible to overwrite parts of the
repository. While this has been fixed in the past for Windows,
the same vulnerability may also exist on other systems that
write to NTFS filesystems. We now reject any paths starting
with ".git:" on all systems.
- CVE-2019-1353: by using NTFS-style 8.3 short names, it was
possible to write to the ".git" directory and thus overwrite
parts of the repository, leading to possible remote code
execution. While this problem was already fixed in the past for
Windows, other systems accessing NTFS filesystems are
vulnerable to this issue too. We now enable NTFS protecions by
default on all systems to fix this attack vector.
- CVE-2019-1354: on Windows, backslashes are not a valid part of
a filename but are instead interpreted as directory separators.
As other platforms allowed to use such paths, it was possible
to write such invalid entries into a Git repository and was
thus an attack vector to write into the ".git" dierctory. We
now reject any entries starting with ".git\" on all systems.
- CVE-2019-1387: it is possible to let a submodule's git
directory point into a sibling's submodule directory, which may
result in overwriting parts of the Git repository and thus lead
to arbitrary command execution. As libgit2 doesn't provide any
way to do submodule clones natively, it is not susceptible to
this vulnerability. Users of libgit2 that have implemented
recursive submodule clones manually are encouraged to review
their implementation for this vulnerability.
### Breaking API changes
* The "private" implementation details of the `git_cred` structure have been
......
......@@ -21,7 +21,29 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#define LOOKS_LIKE_DRIVE_PREFIX(S) (git__isalpha((S)[0]) && (S)[1] == ':')
static int dos_drive_prefix_length(const char *path)
{
int i;
/*
* Does it start with an ASCII letter (i.e. highest bit not set),
* followed by a colon?
*/
if (!(0x80 & (unsigned char)*path))
return *path && path[1] == ':' ? 2 : 0;
/*
* While drive letters must be letters of the English alphabet, it is
* possible to assign virtually _any_ Unicode character via `subst` as
* a drive letter to "virtual drives". Even `1`, or `ä`. Or fun stuff
* like this:
*
* subst ֍: %USERPROFILE%\Desktop
*/
for (i = 1; i < 4 && (0x80 & (unsigned char)path[i]); i++)
; /* skip first UTF-8 character */
return path[i] == ':' ? i + 1 : 0;
}
#ifdef GIT_WIN32
static bool looks_like_network_computer_name(const char *path, int pos)
......@@ -123,11 +145,11 @@ static int win32_prefix_length(const char *path, int len)
GIT_UNUSED(len);
#else
/*
* Mimic unix behavior where '/.git' returns '/': 'C:/.git' will return
* 'C:/' here
* Mimic unix behavior where '/.git' returns '/': 'C:/.git'
* will return 'C:/' here
*/
if (len == 2 && LOOKS_LIKE_DRIVE_PREFIX(path))
return 2;
if (dos_drive_prefix_length(path) == len)
return len;
/*
* Similarly checks if we're dealing with a network computer name
......@@ -272,11 +294,11 @@ const char *git_path_topdir(const char *path)
int git_path_root(const char *path)
{
int offset = 0;
int offset = 0, prefix_len;
/* Does the root of the path look like a windows drive ? */
if (LOOKS_LIKE_DRIVE_PREFIX(path))
offset += 2;
if ((prefix_len = dos_drive_prefix_length(path)))
offset += prefix_len;
#ifdef GIT_WIN32
/* Are we dealing with a windows network path? */
......@@ -1624,8 +1646,12 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs(git_repository *repo, const char *path, size
if (!start)
return true;
/* Reject paths like ".git\" */
if (path[start] == '\\')
/*
* Reject paths that start with Windows-style directory separators
* (".git\") or NTFS alternate streams (".git:") and could be used
* to write to the ".git" directory on Windows platforms.
*/
if (path[start] == '\\' || path[start] == ':')
return false;
/* Reject paths like '.git ' or '.git.' */
......@@ -1637,12 +1663,21 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs(git_repository *repo, const char *path, size
return false;
}
GIT_INLINE(bool) only_spaces_and_dots(const char *path)
/*
* Windows paths that end with spaces and/or dots are elided to the
* path without them for backward compatibility. That is to say
* that opening file "foo ", "foo." or even "foo . . ." will all
* map to a filename of "foo". This function identifies spaces and
* dots at the end of a filename, whether the proper end of the
* filename (end of string) or a colon (which would indicate a
* Windows alternate data stream.)
*/
GIT_INLINE(bool) ntfs_end_of_filename(const char *path)
{
const char *c = path;
for (;; c++) {
if (*c == '\0')
if (*c == '\0' || *c == ':')
return true;
if (*c != ' ' && *c != '.')
return false;
......@@ -1657,13 +1692,13 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs_generic(const char *name, size_t len, const
if (name[0] == '.' && len >= dotgit_len &&
!strncasecmp(name + 1, dotgit_name, dotgit_len)) {
return !only_spaces_and_dots(name + dotgit_len + 1);
return !ntfs_end_of_filename(name + dotgit_len + 1);
}
/* Detect the basic NTFS shortname with the first six chars */
if (!strncasecmp(name, dotgit_name, 6) && name[6] == '~' &&
name[7] >= '1' && name[7] <= '4')
return !only_spaces_and_dots(name + 8);
return !ntfs_end_of_filename(name + 8);
/* Catch fallback names */
for (i = 0, saw_tilde = 0; i < 8; i++) {
......@@ -1685,7 +1720,7 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs_generic(const char *name, size_t len, const
}
}
return !only_spaces_and_dots(name + i);
return !ntfs_end_of_filename(name + i);
}
GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_char(unsigned char c, unsigned int flags)
......@@ -1819,7 +1854,7 @@ GIT_INLINE(unsigned int) dotgit_flags(
git_repository *repo,
unsigned int flags)
{
int protectHFS = 0, protectNTFS = 0;
int protectHFS = 0, protectNTFS = 1;
int error = 0;
flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_LITERAL;
......@@ -1828,16 +1863,12 @@ GIT_INLINE(unsigned int) dotgit_flags(
protectHFS = 1;
#endif
#ifdef GIT_WIN32
protectNTFS = 1;
#endif
if (repo && !protectHFS)
error = git_repository__configmap_lookup(&protectHFS, repo, GIT_CONFIGMAP_PROTECTHFS);
if (!error && protectHFS)
flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS;
if (repo && !protectNTFS)
if (repo)
error = git_repository__configmap_lookup(&protectNTFS, repo, GIT_CONFIGMAP_PROTECTNTFS);
if (!error && protectNTFS)
flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS;
......
......@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ typedef enum {
/* core.protectHFS */
GIT_PROTECTHFS_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_FALSE,
/* core.protectNTFS */
GIT_PROTECTNTFS_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_FALSE,
GIT_PROTECTNTFS_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_TRUE,
/* core.fsyncObjectFiles */
GIT_FSYNCOBJECTFILES_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_FALSE,
} git_configmap_value;
......
......@@ -206,9 +206,8 @@ void test_checkout_nasty__dot_git_dot(void)
*/
void test_checkout_nasty__git_tilde1(void)
{
#ifdef GIT_WIN32
test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", ".git/foobar");
#endif
test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", "git~1/foobar");
}
/* A tree that contains an entry "git~2", when we have forced the short
......@@ -274,6 +273,16 @@ void test_checkout_nasty__dot_git_colon_stuff(void)
#endif
}
/* A tree that contains an entry ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION" because NTFS
* will interpret that as a synonym to ".git", even when mounted via SMB
* on macOS.
*/
void test_checkout_nasty__dotgit_alternate_data_stream(void)
{
test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream", ".git/dummy-file");
test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream", ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file");
}
/* Trees that contains entries with a tree ".git" that contain
* byte sequences:
* { 0xe2, 0x80, 0x8c }
......
......@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
* calls that are supposed to fail!
*/
#define cl_git_fail(expr) do { \
git_error_clear(); \
if ((expr) == 0) \
git_error_clear(), \
cl_git_report_failure(0, 0, __FILE__, __LINE__, "Function call succeeded: " #expr); \
} while (0)
......
......@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ void test_index_tests__add_bypath_to_a_bare_repository_returns_EBAREPO(void)
git_repository_free(bare_repo);
}
static void add_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
static void assert_add_bypath_fails(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
{
git_index *index;
git_buf path = GIT_BUF_INIT;
......@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void add_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
}
/* Test that writing an invalid filename fails */
void test_index_tests__add_invalid_filename(void)
void test_index_tests__cannot_add_invalid_filename(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
......@@ -577,13 +577,69 @@ void test_index_tests__add_invalid_filename(void)
if (!git_path_exists("./invalid/.GiT"))
cl_must_pass(p_mkdir("./invalid/.GiT", 0777));
add_invalid_filename(repo, ".git/hello");
add_invalid_filename(repo, ".GIT/hello");
add_invalid_filename(repo, ".GiT/hello");
add_invalid_filename(repo, "./.git/hello");
add_invalid_filename(repo, "./foo");
add_invalid_filename(repo, "./bar");
add_invalid_filename(repo, "subdir/../bar");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, ".git/hello");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, ".GIT/hello");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, ".GiT/hello");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "./.git/hello");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "./foo");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "./bar");
assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "subdir/../bar");
git_repository_free(repo);
cl_fixture_cleanup("invalid");
}
static void assert_add_fails(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
{
git_index *index;
git_buf path = GIT_BUF_INIT;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
cl_git_pass(git_repository_index(&index, repo));
cl_assert(git_index_entrycount(index) == 0);
entry.path = fn;
entry.mode = GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB;
cl_git_pass(git_oid_fromstr(&entry.id, "e69de29bb2d1d6434b8b29ae775ad8c2e48c5391"));
cl_git_fail(git_index_add(index, &entry));
cl_assert(git_index_entrycount(index) == 0);
git_buf_dispose(&path);
git_index_free(index);
}
/*
* Test that writing an invalid filename fails on filesystem
* specific protected names
*/
void test_index_tests__cannot_add_protected_invalid_filename(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
git_index *index;
cl_must_pass(p_mkdir("invalid", 0700));
cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./invalid", 0));
/* add a file to the repository so we can reference it later */
cl_git_pass(git_repository_index(&index, repo));
cl_git_mkfile("invalid/dummy.txt", "");
cl_git_pass(git_index_add_bypath(index, "dummy.txt"));
cl_must_pass(p_unlink("invalid/dummy.txt"));
cl_git_pass(git_index_remove_bypath(index, "dummy.txt"));
git_index_free(index);
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectHFS", true);
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectNTFS", true);
assert_add_fails(repo, ".git./hello");
assert_add_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x80\xad/hello");
assert_add_fails(repo, "git~1/hello");
assert_add_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x81\xaf/hello");
assert_add_fails(repo, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file");
git_repository_free(repo);
......@@ -599,7 +655,7 @@ static void replace_char(char *str, char in, char out)
*c = out;
}
static void write_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
static void assert_write_fails(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
{
git_index *index;
git_oid expected;
......@@ -616,6 +672,7 @@ static void write_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
*/
fn = git__strdup(fn_orig);
replace_char(fn, '/', '_');
replace_char(fn, ':', '!');
git_buf_joinpath(&path, "./invalid", fn);
......@@ -627,6 +684,7 @@ static void write_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
/* kids, don't try this at home */
replace_char((char *)entry->path, '_', '/');
replace_char((char *)entry->path, '!', ':');
/* write-tree */
cl_git_fail(git_index_write_tree(&expected, index));
......@@ -672,13 +730,13 @@ void test_index_tests__write_invalid_filename(void)
cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./invalid", 0));
write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git/hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, ".GIT/hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, ".GiT/hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, "./.git/hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, "./foo");
write_invalid_filename(repo, "./bar");
write_invalid_filename(repo, "foo/../bar");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".git/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".GIT/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".GiT/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, "./.git/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, "./foo");
assert_write_fails(repo, "./bar");
assert_write_fails(repo, "foo/../bar");
git_repository_free(repo);
......@@ -696,16 +754,52 @@ void test_index_tests__honors_protect_filesystems(void)
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectHFS", true);
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectNTFS", true);
write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git./hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git\xe2\x80\xad/hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, "git~1/hello");
write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git\xe2\x81\xaf/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".git./hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x80\xad/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, "git~1/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x81\xaf/hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file");
git_repository_free(repo);
cl_fixture_cleanup("invalid");
}
void test_index_tests__protectntfs_on_by_default(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
p_mkdir("invalid", 0700);
cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./invalid", 0));
assert_write_fails(repo, ".git./hello");
assert_write_fails(repo, "git~1/hello");
git_repository_free(repo);
cl_fixture_cleanup("invalid");
}
void test_index_tests__can_disable_protectntfs(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
git_index *index;
cl_must_pass(p_mkdir("valid", 0700));
cl_git_rewritefile("valid/git~1", "steal the shortname");
cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./valid", 0));
cl_git_pass(git_repository_index(&index, repo));
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectNTFS", false);
cl_git_pass(git_index_add_bypath(index, "git~1"));
git_index_free(index);
git_repository_free(repo);
cl_fixture_cleanup("valid");
}
void test_index_tests__remove_entry(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
......
......@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ void test_object_tree_write__sorted_subtrees(void)
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_new(&builder, g_repo, NULL));
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entries); ++i) {
git_oid *id = entries[i].attr == GIT_FILEMODE_TREE ? &tid : &bid;
git_oid *id = entries[i].attr == GIT_FILEMODE_TREE ? &tid : &bid;
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL,
builder, entries[i].filename, id, entries[i].attr));
......@@ -418,10 +418,8 @@ void test_object_tree_write__protect_filesystems(void)
*/
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_new(&builder, g_repo, NULL));
#ifndef GIT_WIN32
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git.", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, "git~1", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
#endif
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git.", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, "git~1", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
#ifndef __APPLE__
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git\xef\xbb\xbf", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
......@@ -444,6 +442,7 @@ void test_object_tree_write__protect_filesystems(void)
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git\xef\xbb\xbf", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git\xe2\x80\xad", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
git_treebuilder_free(builder);
}
......
......@@ -362,3 +362,14 @@ void test_path_core__join_unrooted(void)
git_buf_dispose(&out);
}
void test_path_core__join_unrooted_respects_funny_windows_roots(void)
{
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo/bar/foobar", 9, "bar/foobar", "💩:/foo");
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo/bar/foobar", 13, "foobar", "💩:/foo/bar");
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo", 5, "💩:/foo", "💩:/asdf");
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo/bar", 5, "💩:/foo/bar", "💩:/asdf");
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo/bar/foobar", 9, "💩:/foo/bar/foobar", "💩:/foo");
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo/bar/foobar", 13, "💩:/foo/bar/foobar", "💩:/foo/bar");
test_join_unrooted("💩:/foo/bar/foobar", 9, "💩:/foo/bar/foobar", "💩:/foo/");
}
......@@ -116,4 +116,5 @@ void test_path_dotgit__dotgit_modules_symlink(void)
cl_assert_equal_b(true, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", 0, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS|GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS));
cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules . .::$DATA", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
}
Markdown is supported
0% or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment