Unverified Commit 8b89f362 by Patrick Steinhardt Committed by GitHub

Merge pull request #4756 from pks-t/pks/v0.27.4

Release v0.27.4
parents 504bd54a c5dd0ea1
......@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ env:
- OPTIONS="-DTHREADSAFE=OFF -DBUILD_EXAMPLES=ON -DENABLE_WERROR=ON"
dist: trusty
osx_image: xcode8.3
sudo: false
addons:
......
v0.27.4
-------
This is a security release fixing out-of-bounds reads when
processing smart-protocol "ng" packets.
When parsing an "ng" packet, we keep track of both the current position
as well as the remaining length of the packet itself. But instead of
taking care not to exceed the length, we pass the current pointer's
position to `strchr`, which will search for a certain character until
hitting NUL. It is thus possible to create a crafted packet which
doesn't contain a NUL byte to trigger an out-of-bounds read.
The issue was discovered by the oss-fuzz project, issue 9406.
v0.27.3
-------
......
......@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@
#ifndef INCLUDE_git_version_h__
#define INCLUDE_git_version_h__
#define LIBGIT2_VERSION "0.27.3"
#define LIBGIT2_VERSION "0.27.4"
#define LIBGIT2_VER_MAJOR 0
#define LIBGIT2_VER_MINOR 27
#define LIBGIT2_VER_REVISION 3
#define LIBGIT2_VER_REVISION 4
#define LIBGIT2_VER_PATCH 0
#define LIBGIT2_SOVERSION 27
......
......@@ -299,8 +299,11 @@ static int ng_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
pkt->ref = NULL;
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_NG;
if (len < 3)
goto out_err;
line += 3; /* skip "ng " */
if (!(ptr = strchr(line, ' ')))
len -= 3;
if (!(ptr = memchr(line, ' ', len)))
goto out_err;
len = ptr - line;
......@@ -311,8 +314,11 @@ static int ng_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
memcpy(pkt->ref, line, len);
pkt->ref[len] = '\0';
if (len < 1)
goto out_err;
line = ptr + 1;
if (!(ptr = strchr(line, '\n')))
len -= 1;
if (!(ptr = memchr(line, '\n', len)))
goto out_err;
len = ptr - line;
......
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